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IS THE PUBLICATION OF EXIT  
POLL RESULTS MORALLY PERMISSIBLE?
Jorn Sonderholm
1. Introduction
This article is about exit polls. In particular, it addresses the question of whether or not the publication of exit poll results is morally permissible.1 Throughout 
the article, “exit poll” denotes an opinion poll conducted at the exit from a poll-
ing station when people have already voted.2 The question of whether or not the 
publication of exit poll results is morally permissible is of theoretical interest, but 
it is also of significant practical relevance given the fact that the publication of 
exit poll results is against the law in a large number of countries.3 The conclusion 
of the article is that the publication of exit poll results is morally permissible.
 This conclusion is a stronger one than the mere conclusion that the publication 
of exit poll results should be legally permitted. The distinction between legal per-
missibility and moral permissibility can perhaps be made distinct by considering 
the publication of exit poll results in a United States context. The United States 
does not legally prohibit the reporting of exit poll results,4 and it is very likely 
that the publication of such results will continue to be legally permitted under 
free speech legislation. The fact that the publication of exit poll results is legally 
permitted under United States law is, however, compatible with a voluntary 
agreement among interested parties that no exit poll results will be published 
until all polling stations have closed.5 If the conclusion of this article is correct, 
then there is no morally convincing reason as to why interested parties should 
enter into such a voluntary agreement.
 In the next section, the master argument in favor of the moral permissibility of 
the publication of exit poll results is introduced. This argument is a strong one. 
It might, however, be that the conclusion of this argument should, in the end, be 
rejected because there are other, and weightier, arguments in favor of the view 
that the publication of exit poll results is morally impermissible. However, if 
there are no such weightier arguments, then a plausible case has been made for 
the assertion that the publication of exit poll results is morally permissible. Sec-
tion 3 contains a presentation and discussion of five arguments against the moral __s
__n
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permissibility of the publication of exit poll results. I contend that none of these 
arguments succeeds. The truth of this contention is, of course, compatible with 
it being the case that there are other arguments, not discussed in this article, that 
convincingly arrive at the conclusion that the publication of exit poll results is 
morally impermissible.
 Let me end this section by offering a brief overview of what the current state 
of debate is with respect to the issue of whether or not it is morally permissible 
to publish exit poll results. In the distinctively philosophical literature, very 
little has been published on this issue. Typing “exit poll” into the PhilPapers 
search engine (http://philpapers.org) yields only one result,6 and this article is 
not primarily devoted to issues surrounding the publication of exit poll results.7 
In light of this, it seems safe to say that the main issue of this article is not 
one that, in the past, has received significant attention from members of the 
professional philosophical community. This is somewhat odd given that the 
practice of publishing exit poll results is something that is routinely deplored 
in the mainstream media.8
 It is now possible to explain why the five arguments in section 3 have been 
chosen for discussion. Why exactly these arguments and not some different 
ones? The arguments in question have not been chosen because they are the most 
prominent or influential ones in the literature. As mentioned above, there is no 
significant body of literature devoted to the discussion of normative issues sur-
rounding the publication of exit poll results, and, as a result of this, none of the 
five arguments can be attributed to any particular individual. The arguments in 
section 3 have been chosen because they, in my estimate, are the most promising 
and convincing ones that one can put forth if one wishes to defend the view that 
the publication of exit poll results is morally impermissible. If my estimate is 
accurate, and if it turns out that my assessment of the five arguments is correct, 
then the conclusion of the article is justified.
2. The Master Argument in Favor of the Moral Permissibility 
of the Publication of Exit Poll Results
1   (1) For every x, if x is information and if x is constituted by 
voluntary input offered by consenting adults and if x does is not 
endanger public safety9 and does not incite to violence and does 
not constitute hate speech and does not constitute libel and does 
not infringe on third parties’ right to privacy, then the publication 
of x is morally permissible.10 Assumption
 1  (2) If the result of exit poll alpha is information and if the result 
of exit poll alpha is constituted by voluntary input offered by con-
senting adults and if the result of exit poll alpha does not endanger 
public safety and does not incite to violence and does not constitute 
s__
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hate speech and does not constitute libel and does not infringe on 
third parties’ right to privacy, then the publication of the result of 
exit poll alpha is morally permissible. Universal Elimination, 1
 3  (3) The result of exit poll alpha is information. Assumption
 4  (4) The result of exit poll alpha is constituted by voluntary input 
offered by consenting adults. Assumption
 5  (5) The result of exit poll alpha does not endanger public safety 
and does not incite to violence and does not constitute hate speech 
and does not constitute libel and does not infringe on third parties’ 
right to privacy. Assumption
 3, 4  (6) The result of exit poll alpha is information, and the result 
of exit poll alpha is constituted by voluntary input offered by 
consenting adults. Conjunction Introduction 3, 4
 3, 4, 5  (7) The result of exit poll alpha is information and the result of exit 
poll alpha is constituted by voluntary input offered by consenting 
adults, and the result of exit poll alpha does not endanger public 
safety and does not incite to violence and does not constitute hate 
speech and does not constitute libel and does not infringe on third 
parties’ right to privacy. Conjunction Introduction 5, 6
 1, 3, 4, 5  (8) The publication of the result of exit poll alpha is morally 
permissible. Conditional Elimination 7, 2
 A very brief way of informally reconstructing this argument consists in saying 
that the publication of exit poll results is morally permissible because it is the 
publication of a type of information that does not, in a relevant way, resemble 
the types of information the publication of which is normally considered to be 
morally impermissible. At first sight, the publication of exit poll results is simply 
the publication of morally innocent information.
3. Arguments against the Moral Permissibility  
of the Publication of Exit Poll Results
First argument: the being-influenced-by-how-other-people-vote-is-an-especially-
bad-thing argument
1  (1) Voting that is influenced by knowledge of how a representative 
sample of the electorate has voted makes the electoral process morally 
illegitimate. Assumption
2  (2) The publication of exit poll results enables voting that is influ-
enced by knowledge of how a representative sample of the electorate 
has voted. Assumption
3  (3) If voting that is influenced by knowledge of how a representative 
sample of the electorate has voted makes the electoral process mor-
ally illegitimate, then the publication of exit poll results is morally 
impermissible, if the publication of exit poll results enables voting 
__s
__n
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that is influenced by knowledge of how a representative sample of the 
electorate has voted. Assumption
1, 3  (4) The publication of exit poll results is morally impermissible, if 
the publication of exit poll results enables voting that is influenced 
by knowledge of how a representative sample of the electorate has 
voted. Conditional elimination 1, 3
1, 2, 3  (5) The publication of exit poll results is morally impermissible. 
 Conditional Elimination 2, 4
 This argument is valid, but it is not sound. Premise (1) is false. The reason is 
this: if it is the case that voting that is influenced by knowledge of how a repre-
sentative sample of the electorate has voted makes the electoral process morally 
illegitimate, then it is also the case that voting that is influenced by knowledge 
of, say, (i) which news outlets endorse which candidates/political parties, or (ii) 
which trade unions endorse which candidates/political parties, or (iii) what gender 
or race or ethnicity a given candidate has, or (iv) what the physical appearance 
is of a given candidate makes the electoral process morally illegitimate. Add to 
this premise the assumption that voting that is influenced by knowledge of either 
(i), (ii), (iii), or (iv) is not something that makes the electoral process morally 
illegitimate, and one has a sound argument in favor of the view that (1) is false.11
 One can, of course, reject this argument in favor of the falsity of (1) by ac-
cepting the view that voting that is influenced by knowledge of either (i), (ii), 
(iii), or (iv) is something that makes the electoral process morally illegitimate. 
One can furthermore hold the view that anything that enables such voting is 
morally impermissible. However, if one believes that voting that is influenced by 
knowledge of either (i), (ii), (iii), or (iv) is not something that makes the electoral 
process morally illegitimate, then one cannot consistently believe that voting that 
is influenced by knowledge of how a representative sample of the electorate has 
voted is something that makes the electoral process morally illegitimate.
Second argument: the threat to voter participation argument
1  (1) It is an important democratic ideal that as many registered voters 
as possible participate in the electoral process. Assumption
2  (2) If it is an important democratic ideal that as many registered voters 
as possible participate in the electoral process, then the publication of 
exit poll results is morally impermissible, if the publication of exit poll 
results is likely to discourage a non-negligible number of registered vot-
ers from participation in the electoral process. Assumption
3  (3) The publication of exit poll results is likely to discourage a non-
negligible number of registered voters from participation in the electoral 
process.12 Assumption
1, 2  (4) The publication of exit poll results is morally impermissible, if the 
publication of exit poll results is likely to discourage a non-negligible 
s__
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number of registered voters from participation in the electoral process. 
 Conditional Elimination 1, 2
1, 2, 3  (5) The publication of exit poll results is morally impermissible.  
 Conditional Elimination 3, 4
 This argument is valid, but the truth of (3) is very questionable. Premise (3) is 
an empirical claim the truth of which requires solid data. A recent working paper 
estimates that knowledge of exit poll information decreases voter turnout by about 
12 percent. The study is based on data from French overseas territories that voted 
after the election result had already been made public via exit poll information 
from mainland France.13 A study on a 2009 referendum on a proposed change to 
the Danish Law of Succession comes, however, to a rather different conclusion 
with respect to the impact of exit polls on voter turnout:
In sum, the total effect of an exit poll on the incentive to vote early is ambigu-
ous. Once the results of the exit poll is [sic] released, the effect on remaining 
potential voters’ incentive to participate depends on the information revealed 
by the poll. Voting becomes more attractive if the poll reveals a close race, but 
less attractive if it reveals the opposite. As a result of these opposite effects, 
we find that an exit poll’s effect on voter turnout and election outcomes is in 
general ambiguous.14
 Based on an analysis of data from the US 1980 presidential and congressional 
races, another commentator is also very cautious when it comes to estimating the 
effect of exit polls on voter turnout:
Based on a consensus of the data, there is a possibility of a small decrease 
ranging from 1 to 5 percent in total vote in congressional districts where polls 
close significantly later than 8 PM EST in those elections where the exit polls 
suggest a clear winner when previously the race had been considered close. 
No more precise estimate is possible with the data available.15
 Sudman goes on to say that most survey researchers will not think that this is 
a significant effect.16
 Lacking solid empirical data that underpins (3), one might just as well be jus-
tified in thinking not only that (3) is false but something even stronger: namely 
that the publication of exit poll results is likely to encourage a non-negligible 
number of registered voters to participate in the electoral process (voters who 
would not have participated if they had not been exposed to the results of a rel-
evant exit poll).17 The idea here is that there are voters who, after exposure to the 
results of a relevant exit poll, have the impression that the final election result is 
not a foregone conclusion and that their preferred candidate/party is currently 
tied with, or almost tied with, other candidates/parties. This impression is then 
something that makes these voters make their way to the voting booth. Thanks 
to their exposure to the results of a relevant exit poll, they now believe that their 
vote makes a difference.18
__s
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 It should be noted that, in addition to attacking premise (3) of this argument, 
one can also attack premise (1). It is by no means obvious that a high turnout at 
an election is better than a low turnout. In a number of important writings, Jason 
Brennan has argued, rather convincingly to my mind, for the view that polls 
can be polluted by voters who are voting badly.19 On Brennan’s view, citizens 
who have the political right to vote are under no moral obligation to vote, but 
if they decide to do so, they are under a moral obligation not to vote badly. 
Not voting badly means, in most cases, that the individual voter is adequately 
rational, unbiased, just, and informed about her political beliefs.20 Voters who 
lack these qualities are irresponsible, and they ought, according to Brennan, to 
abstain from voting. On this view, (1) is completely misguided, and campaigns 
to increase voter turnout are not something that friends of democratic rule should 
automatically embrace.
One potential problem with campaigns to increase voter participation is that 
they might lower the average level of voter quality. . . . Increased political 
participation could mean that most voters start asking for foolish, ineffective, 
or immoral policies. It could mean that we are stuck with lower-quality gover-
nance than we otherwise would have. Having elections decided by irrational, 
stupid, immoral, or ignorant voters could mean that citizens have to live with 
racist and sexist laws, unnecessary wars, fewer and lower-quality opportunities, 
higher levels of crime and pollution, and lower levels of welfare.21
Third argument: the strategic voting argument
1  (1) It is an important democratic ideal that voters cast their vote in ac-
cordance with their sincere political beliefs. Assumption
2  (2) If it is an important democratic ideal that voters cast their vote in 
accordance with their sincere political beliefs, then strategic voting goes 
against an important democratic ideal. Assumption
1, 2  (3) Strategic voting goes against an important democratic ideal.  
 Conditional elimination 1, 2
4  (4) If strategic voting goes against an important democratic ideal, 
then the publication of exit poll results is morally impermissible, if the 
publication of exit poll results enables strategic voting. Assumption
1, 2, 4  (5) The publication of exit poll results is morally impermissible 
if the publication of exit poll results enables strategic voting.  
 Conditional elimination 3, 4
6  (6) The publication of exit poll results enables strategic voting.  
 Assumption
1,2,4,6  (7) The publication of exit poll results is morally impermissible.  
 Conditional elimination 5, 6
 As a preamble to an assessment of this argument, it should be noted that 
strategic voting is the same as tactical voting. Tactical voting is, throughout this 
s__
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article, given the following standard definition: in a first-past-the-post electoral 
system, a vote is tactical when it is cast for a candidate who the voter believes is 
more likely to win than her preferred candidate. The classic example involves a 
supporter of a party placed third or lower in the constituency choosing to vote 
for one of the front-runners because the voter is wary of “wasting” her vote.22
 Now, the strategic voting argument is valid, but it is not sound.23 Premise (4) 
is false. Premise (4) is a conditional, so (4) is false if and only if its antecedent 
is true and its consequent is false. The antecedent is the proposition “strategic 
voting goes against an important democratic ideal.” For the sake of the argument, 
let us assume that this is true. The consequent is another conditional: namely 
the proposition “the publication of exit poll results is morally impermissible if 
the publication of exit poll results enables strategic voting.” I suggest that this 
conditional is false. My contention is that the mere fact that the publication of 
exit poll results enables strategic voting is not a sufficient condition for it be-
ing the case that the publication of exit poll results is morally impermissible. In 
general, the principle: the fact that x enables y, which goes against an important 
democratic ideal, is sufficient for making x morally impermissible is false. If 
this principle were true, a number of very counterintuitive propositions could be 
proved. Consider, for example, the following argument:
  1*  (1*) It is an important democratic ideal that voters engage 
in gender-neutral voting.24 Assumption
  2*  (2*) If it is an important democratic ideal that voters engage 
in gender-neutral voting, then gender-based voting goes 
against an important democratic ideal.25 Assumption
  1*, 2*  (3*) Gender-based voting goes against an important demo-
cratic ideal. Conditional elimination 1*, 2*
  4*  (4*) If gender-based voting goes against an important 
democratic ideal, then the publication of information that 
reveals the gender of candidates and/or party leaders is 
morally impermissible, if the publication of information 
that reveals the gender of candidates and/or party leaders 
enables gender-based voting. Assumption
  1*, 2*, 4*  (5*) The publication of information that reveals the gender 
of candidates and/or party leaders is morally impermissible, 
if publication of information that reveals the gender of can-
didates and/or party leaders enables gender-based voting.
 Conditional Elimination 3*, 4*
  6*  (6*) Publication of information that reveals the gender of 
candidates and/or party leaders enables gender-based voting.
 Assumption
  1*, 2*, 4*, 6*  (7*) The publication of information that reveals the gender 
of candidates and/or party leaders is morally impermissible.
 Conditional Elimination 5*, 6*
__s
__n
lc
PAQ 30_1 text.indd   59 12/11/15   1:09 PM
60 PUBLIC AFFAIRS QUARTERLY
 The first thing to note about this argument is that it has the same logical form 
as the strategic voting argument. The atomic sentences of the two arguments are, 
however, different. Since the strategic voting argument is valid, so is this. Premise 
(7*) is, I contend, false. If this is the case, then at least one of the four assumptions 
of the argument is false. There is no good reason for rejecting either (1*), (2*), or 
(6*). I suggest, however, that (4*) is false because it has a true antecedent and a 
false consequent. The consequent is false precisely because it asserts that the fact 
that x (the publication of information that reveals the gender of candidates and/or 
party leaders) enables y (gender-based voting), which goes against an important 
democratic ideal, is sufficient for making x morally impermissible.
Fourth argument: the potentially misleading information argument
1  (1) Exit poll results are potentially misleading. Assumption
2  (2) If exit poll results are potentially misleading, then the publication of 
exit poll results is the publication of potentially misleading information.
 Assumption
1, 2  (3) The publication of exit poll results is the publication of potentially 
misleading information. Conditional elimination 1, 2
4  (4) If the publication of exit poll results is the publication of potentially 
misleading information, then the publication of exit poll results is mor-
ally impermissible. Assumption
1, 2, 4  (5) The publication of exit poll results is morally impermissible.  
 Conditional elimination 3, 4
 This argument is valid, but it is not sound. Premise (1) is true. There is good 
empirical evidence for the view that exit polls come in a wide variety of quality. 
Some are methodologically impeccable whereas others are not.26 There is therefore 
good reason to say that, as a whole, exit poll results are potentially misleading. 
Premise (2) is also true. Premise (4) is, however, false. This is so because it has 
unacceptable consequences. If (4) is true, then the proposition “if the publication 
of politicians’ assertions is the publication of potentially misleading information, 
then the publication of politicians’ assertions is morally impermissible.” Let us 
call this proposition (4*). Now, if (4*) is true, then the publication of many types 
of information that we normally think of as being morally permissible becomes 
morally impermissible. It is, for example, not an uncommon phenomenon that 
politicians, in both verbal and written communication, assert things that are (often 
grossly) misleading.27 Also, before an election, promises are often made that are 
not fulfilled after the election.28
 Premise (4*) has as an unacceptable consequence that it is morally impermis-
sible for news outlets to publish information about politicians’ assertions as 
these are made at, say, (i) press conferences, (ii) town hall meetings, and (iii) live 
interviews, and on (iv) social media platforms. The publication of politicians’ 
assertions, as these are made at venues (i), (ii), (iii), or (iv), is the publication 
s__
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of potentially misleading information.29 This is, however, not something that 
should make the publication of this information morally impermissible. There 
is, therefore, good reason to think that (4*) is false. In turn, this means that (4) 
is false.30
Fifth argument: the bandwagon effect argument
1  (1) Voting for a candidate just because she is likely to win the election 
makes the electoral process morally illegitimate. Assumption
2  (2) The publication of exit poll results enables voting for a candidate 
just because she is likely to win the election. Assumption
3  (3) If voting for a candidate just because she is likely to win the election 
makes the electoral process morally illegitimate, then the publication of 
exit poll results is morally impermissible, if the publication of exit poll 
results enables voting for a candidate just because she is likely to win 
the election. Assumption
1, 3  (4) The publication of exit poll results is morally impermissible, if the 
publication of exit poll results enables voting for a candidate just because 
she is likely to win the election. Conditional elimination 1, 3
1, 2, 3  (5) The publication of exit poll results is morally impermissible.  
 Conditional Elimination 2, 4
 As a preamble to an assessment of this argument, it is important to note that, 
in political science, the term “bandwagon effect” denotes the phenomenon that 
people might vote for a candidate just because he or she is likely to win the 
election.31 The opposite of the bandwagon effect is the underdog effect. “The 
underdog effect” denotes the phenomenon that when, at an election, voters per-
ceive a particular party or candidate to be the likely winner, they tend to support 
a competitor who is expected to lose. Voters tend, that is, to support the underdog 
in the race.32 What is the empirical evidence for the occurrence of the bandwagon 
effect and the underdog effect across elections? This is an important question in 
political science.
 One commentator asserts that a “1992 comprehensive review of research on 
bandwagon and underdog effects found mixed results.”33 A recent working pa-
per suggests that evidence of bandwagon voting is found in at least one French 
election: “We also find empirical support for bandwagon voting in which later 
voters, if they participate, are more likely to vote for the expected winner.”34 On 
the other hand, Irwin cites multiple references for the view that the empirical 
research on bandwagon effects does not offer a clear or conclusive picture.35 This 
view is supported by the empirical findings of another commentator:
The observed relation between turnout and perceived closeness of the election 
does not, of course, mean that every voter behaves in the same way. Some 
voters may be encouraged to vote when the election is not close because they 
are sure to be on the winning side (a bandwagon effect). Others may vote to 
__s
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reduce the magnitude of the anticipated winning margin (an underdog effect). 
Overall, however, neither bandwagon or [sic] underdog effects have been 
observed in national [United States] elections.36
 The bandwagon effect argument is somewhat similar to the being-influenced-
by-how-other-people-vote-is-an-especially-bad-thing argument. The proper 
reply to the former argument is therefore one that is somewhat similar to the one 
presented in the discussion of the latter argument.37 Premise (1) is, I contend, 
false. If (1) is true, then the proposition “voting for a candidate just because of 
her physical appearance makes the electoral process morally illegitimate” is true. 
The type of voting behavior where one votes for a candidate just because of the 
way she looks (or how tall, or stylishly dressed, a male candidate is) is empiri-
cally well documented.38 Furthermore, there is no justification for thinking that, 
whereas bandwagon voting39 makes the electoral process morally illegitimate, 
the same is not true of good-looks voting.40 Now, the proposition “voting for a 
candidate just because of her physical appearance makes the electoral process 
morally illegitimate” is false, and this means that (1) is false. It might be that 
voting for a candidate just because of her physical appearance is something that 
goes against an important democratic ideal, but it is not something that makes 
the electoral process morally illegitimate. If this were the case, it would be very 
difficult to find a single electoral process in the history of democracy that was 
morally legitimate, and I suggest that there have been many such electoral pro-
cesses.
 One might reject this argument in favor of the falsity of (1). One might do this 
by denying that the second premise of the argument is false. That is, one might 
believe that “voting for a candidate just because of her physical appearance makes 
the electoral process morally illegitimate” is true just as well as (1) is true. One 
might continue by arguing that, since the publication of exit poll results is mor-
ally impermissible because such publication enables bandwagon voting, then it 
is the case that the publishing of material that reveals the physical appearance of 
political candidates is morally impermissible because such publication enables 
good-looks voting. So, in a morally ideal world, voters would not have access to 
information about how other people have voted or have knowledge of the physi-
cal appearance of political candidates. It is, however, very difficult to deny voters 
knowledge of the latter sort whereas it is relatively easy to deny them access to 
information of the former sort: one can simply make a legal prohibition against 
the publication of exit poll results.
 From a pragmatic perspective, it therefore makes good sense, one might argue, 
to have a legal prohibition against the publication of exit poll results, whereas 
it does not make good sense to have a legal prohibition against the publication 
of material that reveals the physical appearance of political candidates. It is not 
the case that the revelation of such material is not morally impermissible. The 
revelation of such material is morally impermissible, but politics as we know it 
s__
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would cease to exist if the publication of such material were made unlawful. The 
argument would then continue with the assertion that society should not take legal 
steps that have as a consequence that politics as we know it would cease to exist.
 I find this pragmatic defense for a legal prohibition against the publication of 
exit poll results to be unconvincing. If one is of the opinion that bandwagon voting 
and good-looks voting both make the electoral process morally illegitimate and 
that the publication of exit poll results should be made unlawful because such 
publication enables bandwagon voting, then one should also be of the opinion 
that the publication of material that reveals the physical appearance of candidates 
should be made unlawful because such publication enables good-looks voting. 
Sure, such a legal step would change much about the way politics is normally 
conducted in liberal democracies, but this is a price that should be paid in the 
name of consistency.
 It is important to keep in mind that in a scenario in which the publication of 
material that enables good-looks voting is unlawful, it is possible to have a po-
litical system that respects core democratic principles. One could, for example, 
have a system in which voters did not vote for individual candidates but voted 
on (principled) party programs. Each party would have a number of approved 
candidates who, prior to the election, have signed up to the task of defending the 
party program in question in the legislative chamber. The party whose program 
has won the constituency election would then make a lottery draw to select the 
candidate who would take on the task of defending the party program in the 
legislative chamber. In such a system, voters would have no knowledge of the 
gender, or physical appearance, of the candidate who would end up representing 
them.41
 Now, if a person who is of the opinion that good-looks voting is something that 
makes the electoral process morally illegitimate is not ready to bite the bullet and 
accept that such a dramatically different electoral system (as described above) 
should be introduced, then such a person cannot consistently hold onto her view 
that, since bandwagon voting makes the electoral process morally illegitimate 
and since the publication of exit poll results enables bandwagon voting, there 
should be a legal prohibition against the publication of exit poll results.
4. Conclusion
This article has been about exit polls. It has addressed the question of whether 
or not it is morally permissible to publish exit poll results. The conclusion of the 
article is that an affirmative answer should be given to this question. In section 
2, the master argument in favor of the moral permissibility of the publication of 
exit poll results was introduced. It was argued that it might be the case that the 
conclusion of this argument should be rejected if there were other, and weightier, 
arguments against the idea that the publication of exit poll results is morally 
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permissible. In section 3, several arguments against the moral permissibility of 
the publication of exit poll results were outlined and discussed. The conclusion 
of this section was that all these arguments fail in their intended purpose. This 
finding, together with the master argument presented in section 2, justifies the 
view that the publication of exit poll results is morally permissible.
Aalborg University
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and helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.
1. To be precise, the question is that of whether or not it is morally permissible to 
publish exit poll results before all polling stations have closed. It is relatively uncontro-
versial that it is morally permissible to publish exit poll results after all polling stations 
have closed. For reasons of brevity, the qualification “before all polling stations have 
closed” is often omitted hereafter.
2. McLean and McMillan, Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics.
3. A survey of sixty-six countries finds that of the fifty-nine countries that permit 
exit polls, forty-one countries prohibit publication of the results until after all voting 
has concluded. Germany is one of these forty-one countries (Morton et al., “Exit Polls, 
Turnout,” 2). For a fairly up-to-date country-level survey of what the legal constraints are 
on the publication of opinion and exit poll results, see Chung (Freedom to Publish).
4. Morton et al., “Exit Polls, Turnout.”
5. The six major US news organizations, ABC, CBS, CNN, Fox, NBC, and the 
Associated Press, that participate in the National Election Pool (NEP) have pledged to 
exactly such an agreement (Traugott and Lavrakas, Voter’s Guide, viii).
6. Singer, “Ethic Cleansing.”
7. The search was done on October 29, 2014.
8. Mohaptra, “False Exit”; Rove, “Twelve Things”; Silver, “Ten Reasons”; Becker, 
“Schluss mit dem Wahl-Gezwitscher!”
9. This is taken to include false advertising that is likely to lead to the consumption 
and/or use of products that constitute a health risk.
10. With regard to the issue of third parties’ right to privacy: it might, for example, be 
morally impermissible for x to publish y’s voluntarily contributed pictorial information about 
what z looks like in a state of semi-nudeness in her own backyard. For a useful overview of 
issues with respect to the right to privacy, see Lever (On Privacy).
11. To be clear: I do not believe that voting that is influenced by knowledge of either (i), 
(ii), (iii), or (iv) is something that makes the electoral process morally illegitimate. This view 
is consistent with believing that such voting falls short of an important democratic ideal.s__
n__
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12. The justification for (3) is this: having been exposed to exit poll x, some voters do 
not find it worth their time/energy/effort to vote given that their preferred candidate/party 
is depicted in x as being so far ahead or behind that these voters think that their individual 
vote will make no difference for the final election result.
13. Morton et al., “Exit Polls, Turnout.”
14. Andersen and Jensen, “Exit Polls and Voter Turnout,” 129.
15. Sudman, “Do Exit Polls Influence Voting Behavior?,” 331, 339, 338.
16. Ibid., 338.
17. In conjunction with (1), the assumption that that the publication of exit poll results 
is likely to encourage a non-negligible number of registered voters to participate in the 
electoral process makes it easy to construct a sound argument in favor of the view that the 
publication exit poll results is morally permissible.
18. It is a version of the threat to voter participation argument that Karl Rove appeals to 
in his argumentation as to why exit polls are one of the things that the world should toss out 
(Rove, “Twelve Things”). Becker is also of the opinion that this argument shows that the 
publication of exit poll results is problematic (Becker, “Schluss mit dem Wahl-Gezwitscher!”).
19. Brennan, Ethics of Voting; Brennan, “Polluting the Polls,” 535–49.
20. Brennan, “Polluting the Polls,” 536.
21. Brennan, Ethics of Voting, 10. It is an anonymous reviewer from Public Affairs 
Quarterly who suggested to me that (1) might be false. This suggestion prompted me to 
read some of Jason Brennan’s work on the ethics of voting, and, as indicated above, I am of 
the opinion that this work arms one with a number of convincing arguments as to why (1) 
is indeed false. These arguments deserve much more attention than what can be given them 
in this article.
22. McLean and McMillan, Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics.
23. It is, of course, not only the publication of exit poll results that enables strategic vot-
ing. The publication of opinion poll results also enables such voting. For a brief discussion 
of opinion polls and strategic voting, see Michalos (“Ethical Consideratons”). It should be 
noted that, if one is opposed to the publication of exit poll results because the publication 
of such results enables strategic voting, then one must also be opposed to the publication of 
opinion poll results. After all, the publication of such results also enables strategic voting.
24. What I mean by “gender-neutral voting” is voting that is characterized by the fact 
that the voter treats the gender of a candidate and/or party leader as an irrelevant factor when 
she is deliberating about whom to vote for.
25. What I mean by “gender-based voting” is voting that is characterized by the fact that 
the voter treats the gender of a candidate and/or party leader as a relevant factor when she 
is deliberating about whom to vote for.
26. For a recent example of a misleading exit poll, consider the one performed by 
the company Epinion for the national Danish broadcaster (Danmarks Radio) at the 2013 __s
__n
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municipal elections. Danish Prime Minister Helle Thorning-Schmidt’s Social Democrats 
suffered a much smaller setback than initially indicated by the exit poll. The Social Demo-
crats received 29.5 percent of the votes, compared with 30.7 percent in 2009 municipal 
elections. Thorning-Schmidt had already braced for a loss and apologized to supporters at 
a rally before the closing of polling stations after a nationwide exit poll showed that her 
party would lose a quarter of its support from the last municipal election. See http://goo.gl/
mxwtdy (accessed October 27, 2014). For some examples of accurate exit polls, consider 
exit polling at recent United Kingdom general elections. At the 2001 election, when new and 
improved polling methods were used for the first time by the BBC, the size of the Labour 
majority was predicted at 10 p.m. on polling day with an error of just six seats. At the 2005 
and 2010 elections, the number of seats for the largest party was predicted with no error at 
all. See http://goo.gl/NRNjcd (accessed October 28, 2014).
27. Think, for example, of former US Secretary of State Colin Powell’s presentation 
to the United Nations Security Council in 2003 of “irrefutable and undeniable” evidence 
of the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq (http://www.un.org/press/en/2003/
sc7658.doc.htm).
28. Think, for example, of Barack Obama’s promise before the 2008 US presidential 
election that the Guantánamo detention camp would be closed if he were elected to office.
29. News outlets’ own reporting on political events is also the publication of potentially 
misleading information. For an example of factual errors made by the New York Times in 
its political reporting, see the three corrections the newspaper made to its article, published 
on August 14, 2011, on Congressman Darrell Issa (R-CA) (Lichtblau, “Businessman in 
Congress”). So, if the publication of exit poll results is morally impermissible because it is 
the publication of potentially misleading information, then news outlets’ own reporting on 
political events is also morally impermissible.
30. It is a version of the potentially misleading information argument that Mohapatra 
appeals to in his argument as to why the publication of exit poll results is problematic (Mo-
hapatra, “False Exit”). One of Silver’s ten reasons as to why one should ignore exit poll 
results is also constituted by a version of this argument (Silver, “Ten Reasons”).
31. Mutz, “Mechanisms of Momentum.”
32. Schmitt-Beck, “Underdog Effect.”
33. Traugott, “Bandwagon and Underdog Effects.”
34. Morton et al., “Exit Polls, Turnout.”
35. Irwin, “Bandwagon without a Band,” 7.
36. Sudman, “Do Exit Polls Influence Voting Behavior?”
37. It should be noted that, if one is convinced by the bandwagon effect argument against 
the moral permissibility of the publication of exit poll results, then one must also have a 
problem with the publication of opinion poll results. The publication of such results also 
enables voters to vote for the perceived winner of an election. If one is not ready to embrace 
the conclusion that the publication of opinion poll results is morally impermissible, this 
should seriously dampen one’s enthusiasm for the idea that the bandwagon effect argument 
s__
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lc
PAQ 30_1 text.indd   66 12/11/15   1:09 PM
 EXIT POLL RESULTS  67
has force against the moral permissibility of the publication of exit poll results. The ques-
tion of what the relationship is between the publication of exit poll results and opinion poll 
results is an interesting one from a normative perspective, and it is a question that merits an 
extended discussion of its own in a separate article.
38. Lenz and Lawson, “Looking the Part”; Berggren, Jordahl, and Poutvaara, “Looks of 
a Winner.” The preference for good-looking politicians may be linked to ancient adaptations 
for avoiding disease. In fact, the preference for attractive politicians seems to ebb and flow 
with voters’ concerns about germs. See White, Kenrick, and Neuberg (“Beauty at the Ballot 
Box”).
39. The term “bandwagon voting” is here used to denote the type of voting described in 
Premise (1).
40. “Good-looks voting” is here used to denote the phenomenon of voting for a candidate 
just because of her physical appearance.
41. This is on the assumption that the pool from which candidates are drawn is one that 
is diverse with respect to the gender and physical appearance (ethnicity, race, etc.) of the 
candidates.
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